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Abstract 
The approach to temporal reasoning which has proven most popular in AI is the reified approach. 
In this approach, one introduces names for events and states and uses special predicates to assert 
that an event or state occurs or holds at a particular time. However, recently the reified approach 
has come under attack, both on technical and on ontological grounds. Thus, it has been claimed 
that at leasl: some reified temporal Iogics do not give one more expressive power than provided by 
alternative approaches. Moreover, it has been argued that the reification of event and state types in 
reified temporal logics, rather than event and state tokens, makes the ontology more complicated 
than necessary. 
In this paper, we present a new reified temporal logic, called TRL, which we believe avoids 
most of these objections. It is based on the idea of reifying event tokens instead of event types. 
However, unlike other such attempts, our logic contains “meaningful” names for event tokens, 
thus allowing us to quantify over all event tokens that meet a certain criterion. The resulting logic 
is more expressive than alternative approaches. Moreover, it avoids the ontologically objectionable 
reification of event types, while staying within classical first-order predicate logic. 
1. Introchction 
Reasonmg about time and change is of great importance in artificial intelligence (for 
an overview, see [ 151) . For example, in order to behave intelligently, an agent needs 
to be able to plan its actions, and in order to do so, it needs to be able to reason about 
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the consequences of its actions. This in turn requires that the agent can foresee the 
changes that its actions bring about in the world. Given the advantages that logic has 
for knowledge representation (see [ 12, Chapter 31 for an overview), it seems natural 
to try to model this type of reasoning in temporal logic. 
Classical logics disregard the temporal dimension when it comes to assigning truth 
values to propositions. Propositions are assigned a truth value once and for all, and this 
truth value is not assumed to change over time. Temporal logics have been designed 
specifically to formalize the notion of time. Statements are no longer timelessly true or 
false but true or false at a certain time. Logicians have explored two main approaches 
to formulating temporal logics. 
The first approach, which, following Haugh [ 81, we will call the method of temporal 
arguments (MTA) , simply includes time as an additional argument in the predicate and 
function symbols. 3 Thus, whereas normally dances would be a 2-place predicate, in 
MTA dances would become a 3- or 4-place predicate, where the additional arguments 
might be the time at which the original proposition was true, or the point at which the 
proposition starts to be true and the point at which the proposition ceases to be true. 
Often, in order to accord a special status to time and to improve the efficiency of the 
theorem prover, it is convenient to move to a many-sorted logic whose sorts include the 
sort of normal individuals and the sort of time points (or intervals). One then normally 
also defines a set of temporal ordering predicates to be able to do temporal reasoning. 
An alternative way to incorporate time is by complicating the model theory. This 
is the modal temporal approach. Using a Kripke-style possible world approach, the 
different times become different possible worlds, while the accessibility relationship 
becomes a temporal ordering relationship. Different modal temporal logics are obtained 
by imposing different properties on this relationship. A formula 4 is true with respect to 
a particular time t. In order to make the syntax reflect the more complicated semantics, 
one needs to introduce a number of modal operators. Traditionally, these include F (“at 
some future time”), P (“at some past time”), G (“at any future time”) and H (“at 
any past time”). However, for most AI applications, these operators are not sufficient, 
and one usually needs to introduce further modal operators (see, e.g., Reichgelt [ 111 
who introduces an AT operator scheme, or Fischer [5] who introduces a whole range 
of additional modal operators). 
Both approaches have their own pros and cons (see [ 111, for an overview). For 
example, the method of temporal arguments has the advantage that it is a standard first- 
order logic, and one can therefore make use of standard theorem proving techniques. 
This is clearly not the case for modal temporal logic. On the other hand, modal temporal 
logic seems more expressive and allows one for example to express propositions with 
repeated temporal expressions, such as “Jordi will have danced with Iolanda”. However, 
neither approach allows one to quantify over propositions. As a result, it is not possible 
to express what in the remainder of this paper we will call general temporal knowledge. 
Examples of general temporal knowledge include “effects never precede their causes”, 
or “incompatible states do not temporally overlap”. 
3 Although Haugh gives a more general definition that leaves room for using as a basis any type of logic, 
we restrict ourselves to the use of classical first-order predicate calculus as the basis. 
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It is for reasons like these that a third approach has gained wide acceptance in artificial 
intelligence. Shoham [ 131 calls this approach the reified approach. In reified temporal 
logic, one reifies propositions and introduces names for them. One then uses predicates 
such HOLDS or OCCURS to indicate that the proposition named is true at a certain time, 
or over a certain interval. Examples of this approach are given by McDermott [lo], 
Allen [ 11, Kowalski and Sergot [ 91, Dean and McDermott [4], Shoham [ 13,141, and 
Reichgelt [ 111. The latter two attempt to give a precise model-theoretic semantics for 
reified temporal logics. 
Although reified logics have proven very popular, recently they have come under 
attack. Galton [ 71, for example, considers them “philosophically suspect and technically 
unnecessary”. Our aim in this paper is to show that one can avoid the philosophical 
problems that Galton objects to, while giving one the desired expressive power. The 
outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the different reified 
logics. In Section 3, we discuss the objections that have been raised against reified 
temporal logics. In Section 4, we propose our reified temporal logic which avoids the 
objections. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Reified. temporal logics 
The most straightforward way to define a reified temporal logic is as a sorted logic. 
There are three main types, namely individuals, temporal elements, i.e., points in time 
or intervals, and temporal entities, i.e. states or events that are true at particular points 
in time or over intervals of time. It is these temporal entities that give reified logic its 
reified nature. As Shoham [ 13,141 observes, typically, temporal entities correspond to 
propositions in a non-temporal first-order logic. 
One can generate a reified temporal language RTL from a standard a-temporal first- 
order language Lint by (i) introducing names of sort temporal entity in RTL for the 
propositions in Lint, (ii) introducing a new sort temporal element, and (iii) introducing 
a number of what in the remainder of the paper we will call temporal occurrence pred- 
icates, such as HOLDS and OCCURS which link the proposition names with particular 
times. 
RTL names for LZnt propositions can be generated as follows. Each function symbol 
or constant in Lint is also a function symbol or constant in RTL. In the case of a function 
symbol, all its arguments are individuals, while its value is an individual as well. The 
sort of the RTL constant is an individual too. Each n-place predicate symbol in Lint 
becomes an n-place function symbol in RTL whose arguments are all individuals, but 
whose value is a temporal entity. Thus, a 2-place LZnt predicate like dunces becomes a 
2-place fu,nction symbol in RTL. 
Different temporal elements can be taken as primitive. For example, Allen’s reified 
logic uses intervals as its only temporal elements, whereas both McDermott and Shoham 
use points. Thus, there are differences between reified temporal logics because the 
nature of Ihe time primitive. However, for the purposes of our present discussion, such 
differences are irrelevant. 
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Each reified temporal logic is also characterized by its temporal occurrence predicates. 
Different reified temporal logics make different choices. However, typically they include 
predicates such as HOLDS to indicate that some state is true during some period, and 
OCCURS to indicate that some event occurs over some period. Galton [6] makes a 
further diversification of these predicates depending on whether the state or event is said 
to be true at an instant, on a period or in a period. 
Further differences arise because the nature of the temporal entities. Typically, reified 
temporal logics distinguish between different temporal entities according to the pattern 
of occurrence of the Lht proposition that the temporal entity names. For example, we 
may distinguish between properties and events. Properties roughly correspond to states 
and hold “homogeneously” over a particular interval of time: if a property, such as a 
house being red, holds over an interval i, then it holds over all the subintervals of i as 
well : 
HOLDS(p, Z) ++ (VZ’) (ZN(Z’, Z) + HOLDS(p, 1’) >. 
On the other hand, if an event occurs over an interval, it does not occur over any 
subinterval. Shoham [ 131 gives a more exhaustive classification of temporal entities. 
Part of the attraction of reified temporal logics is that they allow one to quantify 
over propositions. The language contains names for propositions and as a result one can 
express general temporal knowledge without any difficulty. For example, the existence 
of a causal relation between an event e and an state s can be expressed by CAUSE( e, s) 
and general temporal knowledge about this type of causal relations by4 
(ve,S)(CAUSE(e,s) --f (Yt,t’)((OCCURS(e,t) AHOLDS(s,t’)) -_) (t < t’))). 
The researchers who originally introduced reified temporal logic did not define an 
explicit model-theoretic semantics for their systems. Shoham [ 13,141 attempts to rectify 
this situation. Shoham observes that in Allen’s logic in particular, the first argument to 
the HOLDS predicate looks very much like a proposition in propositional calculus. Thus, 
Allen wants to be able to say things like: 
HOLDS( dances( Jordi, Zolanda) A tired( Pedro), i) . 
Shoham then suggests that the reified temporal logics look very much like formalizations 
of the model theory of modal temporal logic with HOLDS corresponding to b, and 
Shoham suggests that a semantics for reified temporal logic should be built on the 
basis of this observation. Because Shoham’s work has been a reference for subsequent 
work, it is worth to discuss it in a little more detail. We will argue that Shoham’s 
logic is not a truly reified temporal logic, and that, as a result, some of the objections 
that have been raised against Shoham’s logic, do not apply to reified temporal logic in 
general. 
4 The actual formulation given here is not without its problems. For example, the proposition states that for 
every time event e occurs and state s holds, s is later than e. Clearly, this is too strong. One needs to be able 
to relate specific occurrences of e to specific occurrences of s. In fact, we shall see below that the proposal of 
taking event and state tokens as primitives, rather than event and state types, is partly based on the problems 
inherent in the formulation below. However, at this stage, we ate merely illustrating a reified approach. 
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Shoham’s logic is a two-sorted logic, with as its only sorts times and individuals. 
Apart from the normal recursive rules for constructing well-formed formulas, Shoham 
includes two rules for generating atomic well-formed formulas. The first states that, 
if tl and t:! are temporal terms, i.e. terms referring to individuals of sort time, then 
tl = t2 and tl .$ t2 are well-formed formulas. The second rule gives the following 
definition of an atomic formula: if tl and t2 are temporal terms, il,. . . , i, are non- 
temporal terms (terms referring to individuals), r is an n-place relation symbol, then 
TRUE(tl,tz,r(il,. . . , i,) ) is a well-formed formula. Thus, something like 
TRUIS( t I, t2, dances (Jordi, Iolanda) ) 
is a well-formed expression. Note that in Shoham’s logic, dances is explicitly called a 
relation symbol. 
In the semantics, Shoham makes a distinction between entities of sort time and 
entities of sort individual. The denotation of a constant of type time is a point in time; 
the denotation of a constant of type individual is an individual; the denotation of a 
relation symbol is a function from pairs of points in time into relations over the set of 
individuals. The expression 
TRUE( t] , t2, dances (Jordi, Iolanda) ) 
is true if the pair consisting of the individuals denoted by the constants Jo& and ZoZanda 
is a member of the 2-place relation denoted by the 2-place predicate symbol dances at 
the times tt and t2. 
As pointed out in [ 111, although very interesting, Shoham’s logic is not a fully reified 
temporal logic. Although Shoham reifies times, and allows for constants in the language 
to refer to points in time, and variables to quantify over them, the third argument to 
TRUE is not an expression one can quantify over. As we noted above, Shoham calls 
dances a relation symbol, rather than a function symbol. As a result, the subexpression 
dances( Jordi, Zolanda) does not denote an individual, and hence cannot be quantified 
over. In fact, TRUE is perhaps best regarded as a modal operator scheme. It defines 
a set of temporal modal operators: by adding two time expressions, one generates a 
new modal operator, and Reichgelt’s [ II] AT operator is in fact very similar to what 
Shoham calls the predicate TRUE. 5 
An alternative way of making the same point is the following. Although Shoham 
points out that one of the attraction of reified temporal logic is that it allows one to 
express general temporal knowledge, ironically, such statements cannot be expressed in 
Shoham’s logic. Shoham’s logic does not allow for quantification over the third argument 
of TRUE. 
The hybrid nature of Shoham’s logic also explains some of the other criticisms in the 
literature. For example, Bacchus, Tenenberg and Koomen [ 21 point to the lack of a proof 
theory for Shoham’s logic. They use this to argue in favour of a non-reified temporal 
s There are other interpretations possible of Shoham’s logic. As was pointed out to us by one of the 
reviewers, it is possible to regard it as a second-order logic with dances as a first-order predicate and TRUE 
as a second-order predicate. However, since Shoham explicitly states that he wants his logic to be first-order, 
this interpretation would seem to run counter to Shoham’s intentions. 
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logic, which is very much in the spirit of Haugh’s method of temporal arguments. While 
we believe that Bacchus et al. are correct in criticising Shoham’s logic for its lack of a 
proof theory, it seems to us that they mis-diagnose the reason behind this problem: it is 
not the reified nature of Shoham’s logic that is to blame; it is the fact that the logic is 
in fact a modal logic and not fully reified. 
In order to overcome some of the problems associated with Shoham’s logic, Reichgelt 
[ 1 I ] defines a fully reified temporal logic. Reichgelt takes as his starting point Shoham’s 
observation that the temporal entities used in the reified logics of Allen and McDermott 
are very similar to propositions. He then formalises, in first-order logic, the semantics 
of a modal temporal logic which is identical to standard modal temporal logic, except 
for the introduction of an AT operator scheme which allows one to construct modal 
operators to refer to specific points in time. Although the resulting system is fully 
reified, and moreover is a sorted first-order logic, it is rather baroque in nature. For 
example, Reichgelt needs to introduce both constants referring to actual individuals, as 
well as constants referring to names for individuals. He then also needs a predicate to 
express that some name refers to some individual. While the resulting system allows one 
to use a theorem prover for first-order logic, its complicated nature makes it extremely 
unlikely that such a theorem prover would achieve acceptable efficiency. Moreover, 
representing information in the logic is nontrivial. 
3. Objections to reified temporal logic 
While reified temporal logics have enjoyed considerable popularity, recently they have 
come under attack. A number of authors have argued that reified temporal logics are 
unnecessarily complicated and force one to accept a philosophically suspect ontology. 
In this section, we review the criticisms. 
3.1. BTK unreification 
A first piece of work that we want to discuss here is the system of Bacchus, Tenenberg 
and Koomen [ 21. They propose a logic called BTK which is very much in the spirit 
of the method of temporal arguments. 6 Bacchus et al. claim that this approach is more 
expressive than has been historically recognized in AI. For instance, they show that BTK 
is more expressive than Shoham’s temporal logic by formulating a translation algorithm 
from Shoham’s logic into BTK. Thus, Shoham’s 
TRUE ( t 1, t2, dances (Jordi, Iolanda) ) 
is translated to 
dances ( t 1, t:! ,Jordi , Iolanda) . 
’ The main innovation in BTK over MTA, is that each predicate and function symbol can take any number 
of temporal arguments. 
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They claim, rightly in our opinion, that translating into BTK has the advantage that 
one can now use a theorem prover for many-sorted first-order logics to reason about 
temporal information, something which is not possible in Shoham’s system. 7 
Nevertheless, as we pointed out above, Shoham’s one is not a fully reified temporal 
logic. As Bacchus et al. point out themselves, BTK has some eipressive limitations 
compared to a real reified logic, such as Allen’s, in that one is not able to quantify over 
propositiorzs. As a result, pieces of general temporal knowledge cannot be expressed in 
BTK. 
3.2. Gabon’s unrei$cation 
Galton [7] proposes a different method of unreification. His proposal is based on 
the idea of incorporating state and event tokens. It is an attempt to keep some of the 
increased expressive power that reified logics provide while avoiding the complications 
inherent in reification. His argument is also partly ontological. Galton argues that the 
reified logics force one to reify event types. Thus, Allen’s HOLDS or OCCURS predicate 
defines a relationship between an interval and a state or event type respectively. Taking 
his lead from Davidson [ 31, and following a long tradition in ontology, Galton argues 
that a logic which forces one to reify event tokens instead of event types, would be 
preferable on ontological grounds. Using Occam’s razor, Galton argues that one should 
not multiply the entities in one’s ontology without need, and that, unless one is a die- 
hard Platonist, one would prefer an ontology based on particulars rather than universals. 
On the other hand, Galton is sympathetic to the aim of staying within first-order logic, 
and he explicitly rejects Shoham’s logic because it is modal. In summary, Galton’s aim 
is to define a logic without philosophically dubious reification while staying inside the 
bounds of classical predicate logic. 
In order to achieve his aims, Galton uses the notion of token. A token basically is 
the occurri:nce of some either event of state at some point in time. For instance, “Jordi 
dancing with Iolanda at 3.00 pm” is an event token. On the one hand, tokens act as 
additional parameters to predicate and function symbols, as in the method of temporal 
arguments, while on the other also being used in the temporal occurrence predicates. 
Thus, something like 
HOLDS(dances( Jorzii, lolanda) , i) 
in Allen’s logic, becomes 
(3e) (TRUE( i, e) A dances(Jordi, Zolunda, e)). 
’ It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that it is not in general possible to translate a modal temporal 
logic into a logic such as BTK, at least not if one is not willing to accept quantification over non-existing 
individuals. ‘Thus, Reichgelt [ I I ] points that a naive translation of the modal propositions P( 3x) (p(x)) 
and (3x)(Q1(n)) as (3t)(%r)(t < nnwAp(n,t)) and (3x)(3t)(t < nowAp(x,t)) respectively, would 
not be acceptable for a temporal logic with a variable domain of individuals. After all, in such a logic, the 
original modal propositions would not be equivalent, whereas their non-modal translations would be. It is 
of course possible to introduce an existence predicate into the non-modal language, but this would have the 
ontologically unacceptable consequence that existence becomes a property of individuals. 
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Because Galton introduces tokens, he clearly avoids the philosophically dubious reifi- 
cation of types. Also, his system is a sorted first-order logic with as sorts times, event 
tokens, state tokens and individuals. 
However, although we believe the introduction of the notion of tokens to be appro- 
priate, the way in which Galton introduces them would seem to lead to problems. For 
example, it is not clear how Galton represents causal relations. Galton, in our view cor- 
rectly, proposes to regard causality as a relationship between tokens, and he introduces 
a predicate ECAUSE( el , e2), which he defines as an abbreviation of 
E(el) AE’(e2) AOCCURS(er,i) AOCCURS(e2,i+ 1) A 
(Vi)(‘v’e)(E(e) AOCCURS(e,i) + 
(3e’)(E’(e’) AOCCURS(e’,i+ 1))). 
Unfortunately, it seems to us that this proposal is problematic. After all, E and E’ are 
not primitive predicates in the language. Instead, they need to be regarded as lambda 
expressions of the form 
h(x)(dances(Jordi,Iolanda,x)). 
But, it is not clear to us how one can determine the identity of the lambda expression 
given that all that one has is the name of the event token. Therefore, the proposed 
formula can at best be treated as a formula schema, and as such cannot be part of the 
logic. For every causal relationship that one wants to talk about in a particular theory, 
one would have to find an instantiation of the predicates E and Et, and it is in this sense 
that we contend that the above formula schema does not directly express any general 
temporal knowledge about causality. 
Another problem is that nothing in Galton’s formulation prevents the same event token 
from occurring at more than one time. Thus, something like 
(se) (dances(Jordi, Iolanda, e) A OCCURS(e, i) A OCCURS(e, i’)) 
would be a well-formed expression. Since event tokens can occur at only one time, this 
proposition can never be true. In order to avoid this problem, Galton would therefore 
have to include the axiom: 
(b’e)(\Ji)(OCCURS(e,i) -+ -(ZIi’)(i’#iAOCCURS(e,i’))). 
Although we find Galton’s proposal to introduce tokens attractive, we believe that 
the primary problem with Galton’s approach arises from the way in which he intro- 
duces tokens. By regarding names for tokens as primitive entities, one loses certain 
information about the token. The resulting logic, although first-order and not reifying 
event types, does not, it seems to us, allow for a completely satisfactory represen- 
tation of causality and general temporal knowledge. In the next subsection, we will 
provide additional arguments for the need to have tokens in one’s ontology. We will 
then propose a token-based approach based on the idea of having “meaningful” names 
for tokens. 
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3.3. The need for tokens 
Before we present our logic, we give a few additional arguments for the need to 
include event and state tokens in the ontology. In the previous subsection, we saw that 
Galton objiected to including event and state types on ontological grounds. However, 
there are some further arguments which concern the expressive power of the language. 
A reified temporal logic which is based on “pure types”, i.e. one which does not 
have any l.okens, suffers from a number of expressive limitations, in particular when 
it comes to expressing causality. In such a logic, causal relations have to be regarded 
as involving event types. However, this leads to problems when one wants to express 
what one might call “one-ofS” causal relations, such as “the rain of the 22th caused 
the landslide on the 23th”. Clearly, in order to express this, one requires a way to refer 
to particul,ar occurrences of a type. Similar problems arise when it comes to expressing 
multiple causes. such as “the rain of the 22th caused three different landslides”. If the 
landslides have the same features and are differentiated only by the time they occur, 
then they ,will be represented by the same type. In other words, unless one has tokens 
in the language, one cannot differentiate between them. In this context, Haugh [ 81 talks 
about the “individuation and counting of the events of a particular type”. One cannot, 
for instance, refer to the set of effects caused by the rain of the 22th. Also, one cannot 
quantify over causes and the related set of the effects each produces in order to assert 
general constraints between them. 
It is interesting to note that Allen, whose logic is based on event and state types, 
implicitly :seems to recognise the need for event tokens (as also pointed out by Galton). 
Allen’s ECAUSE predicate has as parameters not only event types but also times. Thus, 
Allen uses 
ECAUSE(type,, timel, type,, timez) 
to state that an occurence of an event of type, at time] caused the occurrence of an 
event of type, at timez. Because of the use of this additional argument, Allen is indeed 
able to express “one-off’ causal relations, the occurrence of multiple effects of the same 
cause, as well as general temporal knowledge. 
4. The tolken-reified temporal logic 
We have seen that many of the reified logics are not entirely satisfactory. For example, 
Shoham’s logic is only partially reified with the consequences that the logic is not 
expressive enough and that the question of how to implement a theorem prover for 
it remains open. In Allen’s reified approach, the reification of types provides higher 
expressive power, but it is achieved through the use of “implicit tokens”. Moreover, 
types are (objectionable on ontological grounds. We have seen, on the other hand, that 
none of the attempts to unreify temporal logic give one the required expressive power. 
In this section, we present a new reified temporal logic TRL (token-reified logic), which 
we believe offers the best of all worlds. TRL is more natural and elegant than Galton’s 
logic. Moreover, unlike Shoham’s logic, TRL is non-modal and therefore allows one 
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to use a standard theorem prover. Finally, unlike Allen’s system, TRL achieves all this 
without reifying event types. 
The primary intuition behind TRL is that we would like to reify event tokens, rather 
than event types. However, rather than making names for event tokens an additional 
argument to a predicate, we propose to introduce “meaningful” names for event tokens. 
This allows us to express statements about all event tokens that meet some condi- 
tion. 
Technically, TRL keeps the temporal occurrence predicates, such as HOLDS and 
OCCURS, * but makes them l-place. Their only argument then is the name for a state 
or event token. Moreover, rather than making an n-place predicate symbol into an 
(n + 1 )- or (n + m)-place predicate symbol, as Galton and Bacchus et al. respectively 
do, we make them into an (n+2)-place function symbol. When applied to n individuals 
and 2 points in time, the function returns a state or an event token. The predicate 
HOLDS or OCCURS then simply states that this state token indeed holds, or that this 
event token indeed occurred. Because we now have “meaningful” names for state and 
event tokens, we can quantify over “parts of an event token”. This allows us to have our 
cake and eat it: while our ontology is as simple as Galton’s in that we only allow for 
individuals, times, and event tokens, quantification allows us to express general temporal 
knowledge. 
We first present the syntax of TRL before we briefly give the semantics. We then 
illustrate the expressive power of our logic. 
The logical language TRL we use is that of a sorted first-order logic. We use the 
following sorts: 
l I, individuals, 
l T, times, 
l S, state tokens, 
l E, event tokens. 
Each constant, predicate symbol or function symbol has of course a sortal signature 
associated with it. In general, the signatures can be generated automatically from an 
initial, non-temporal language Lint. For example, each n-place predicate symbol in Lint 
becomes an (n + 2)-place function symbol in Z. with its first n arguments being of 
type I, its last two arguments being of type T, and its output being either of type S or 
type E. 
TRL contains, amongst others, the following l-place predicates: 
l HOLDS, with an argument of type S, 
l OCCURS, with an argument of type E. 
TRL also contains the 2-place predicate <, whose arguments are both of type T. 
We also introduce the following two l-place function symbols, whose input argument 
is of type S or E and whose output argument is of type T, namely BEGIN and END. 
x The main aim of this paper is to present the logic, not to argue that these particular temporal occurrence 
predicates or the particular temporal entities that we propose are the correct ones. Nothing in the logic hinges 
on these choices. The same applies to the choice of two additional temporal arguments to denote the begin 
and end point respectively. Again, nothing hinges on this, and we could just as easily have formulated the 
logic using intervals. 
L. Vila, H. Reichgelt/Art@cial Intelligence 83 (1996) 59-74 69 
They denote the starting point and the end point of the event token or state token 
respectiv’ely. Their definition is straightforward. Thus 
EfvD(f(...,t,t’)) =t’, 
BEGIN(f(...,t,t’)) =t, 
where f(. . . , t, t’) is a term referring to an event or state token. 
Finally, our language contains the l-place function symbol TYPE. It takes as argument 
the name of an event or a state token and returns a function from pairs of points in time 
into the set of event or state tokens respectively. Hence, 
7-YR?z(~(...,t,t’)) 
is basically syntactic sugar for 
The semantics of the logic is relatively straightforward as well. TRL models contain 
four disjoint sets, namely the set of times DT, individuals DI, state tokens Ds, and 
event tokens DE, a partial ordering relation < over DT, and an interpretation function 
1. Z associates with each constant an object of the corresponding sort. Thus, constants 
of type ;r are mapped onto objects from DT, etc. Moreover, Z maps n-place function 
symbols onto n-place functions from the various sets of objects into the appropriate set 
of objects, again as determined by the signature of the function symbol. Finally, Z maps 
the 2-place predicate symbol < onto the temporal ordering relation <, whereas the other 
n-place predicate symbols are mapped onto the appropriate relations, again respecting 
the signature of the relation symbol. Additionally, there are a few conditions that we 
need to impose on our models in order to reflect intuitions about the nature of time and 
the nature of the temporal entities. 
First, one of the differences between states and events is that if a state is true over an 
interval 1, it is also true over all subintervals of i. In the case of events, if an event is 
true over an interval i, then it is false over all subintervals of i. We need to ensure that 
our model theory does indeed enforce this. Thus, we have the following conditions: 
if Z(f(x,. ..,x’,tl,t:!)) EZ(HOLDS) andZ(tt) <Z(tg) <Z(t4) <Z(t2) 
then Z( f( x, . ..,x’,tj,t4)) cZ(HOLDS), 
if Z(f(x,. . . ,.x’,t,,t2)) EZ(OCCURS) andZ(tl) <Z(t3) <1(t4) <Z(t2) 
then 2( f( x, . ..,x’,t3,t4)) $I(OCCURS). 
Second, we need to ensure that the denotations of the special function symbols 
BEGIN, END and TYPE are indeed correct. We therefore need the following additional 
constraints: 
Z(BEGZN(f(x,. ..,x’,t,t’))) =X(t), 
Z(END( f (x, . . . ,x’,t,t’))) =z(t’), 
Z( TYPE( f(x, . . . ,x’,s,s’)))((z(t),Z(t’))) =Z(f(x,...,x’,t,t’)). 
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Finally, a number of additional constraints may have to be imposed on the temporal 
ordering relation to reflect one’s intuitions about the nature of time. For example, one 
may want to guarantee the temporal extension of tokens by the inclusion of 
I(BEGIN(f(x,... ,x’,t,t’))) < Z(END(f(x,. . . ,x’,t,t’))). 
The denotations of more complex expressions can now be defined in the normal ways. 
For example, 
if f is an n-place function symbol, and f(x, . . . , x’) is a well-formed term, 
then Z(f(x,. . . TX’>> =z(f)(Z(x),...,Z(x’)). 
The notions of truth and validity are also defined in the normal way. For example, 
Let (M,Z) be a TRL model, 
P an n-place predicate symbol, 
and (x . . . ,x’) n terms of the appropriate sorts, 
then (M,Z) b P(x ,..., x’) iff (Z(x) ,..., X(x’)) ET(P). 
It is left as an exercise to the reader that the following statements are valid in the 
given model theory: 
(‘de : E)(OCCURS(TYPE(e)(BEGIN(e),END(e))) +-+ OCCURS(e)), 
(Vs : S)(HOLDS(TYPE(s)(BEGZN(s),END(s))) +-+ HOLDS(s)), 
(b’s: S, tl,tz,t3,t4: T)((HOLDS(TYPE(s)((t,,tz))) At1 < t3 < t4 < t2) + 
HOLDS(TYPE(s)((tg,t4)))), 
(ye: E, tl,t2,t3,t4 : T)((OCCURS(TYPE(e)((tl,tz))) At1 < tg < t4 < t2) --f 
lOCCuRS(TYPE(e)((rs,t4)))), 
(V/e : E)(BEGZN(e) <END(e)), 
(Vs: S)(BEGIN(s) < END(s)). 
Although any axiomization of our logic will have to include the above formulas, as 
well as obviously the axioms for classical first-order predicate calculus, we have, as yet, 
not established whether this set of axioms is complete. 
We demonstrate our language by simply giving a number of statements. Note that 
we introduce two predicates for causation. We are forced to do so because our logic is 
sorted and an event can cause both another event and a state. The predicate ECAUSE is 
used to denote a causal relationship between two events, while the predicate CAUSE is 
used to denote a causal relationship between an event and a state. 
( 1) Jordi danced with Iolanda from 3.00 to 5.00 pm. 
OCCURS( dances( Jo&i, lolanda, 3,5) ) . 
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(2) Jordi danced with Iolanda. 
(3, t’ : T) (OCCURS(dunces( Jo&, Zolanda, t, t’) ) ) . 
(3) Whenever Jordi dances with somebody, they get tired. 
(VX : I, t, t’ : T) (OCCURS(dunces(Jordi,x, t, t’)) -+ 
(Iv, v’ : T) (t < v < t’ A HOLDS( tired( x, v, v’) ) ) ) . 
(4) Jordi deciding to dance at time t causes him to dance at t + 1. 
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(V’t:T)(3x:Z, v,v’:T) 
(ECAUSE(decides_to_dance(Jordi, x, t, v) , dance.s(Jordi, t + 1, v’) ) ) . 
(5) Whenever Jordi dances with somebody, it causes them to be tired. 
(Vx:Z, t,t’:T)(3v:T, u’:T) 
(CAUSE(dunces(Jordi, x, t, t’), tired(x, v, v’))). 
(6) Whenever a cause occurs its effects hold. 
(‘de: E, s: S)(OCClJRS(e) ACAUSE(e,s) + HOLDS(s)). 
(7) Causes precede their effects, 
(Ve : E, s : S) (CAUSE( e, s) + 
(OCCURS(e) -+ 
(HOLDS(s) ABEGZN(e) <BEGIN(s)))). 
(8) B’eing happy and tired are incompatible states for Jordi. 
(Vt, t’, u, v’ : T) (ZNCOMPATZBLE( happy( Jo&, t, t’) , tired( Jo&i, v, v’) ) ) . 
(9) Incompatible states do not overlap in time. 
(Vs, s’ : S) (ZNCOMPATZBLE(s, s’) -+ 
( (HOLDS(s) A HOLDS( s’) ) + 
(END(s) <BEGIN v END(s’) < BEGIN(s)))). 
Some ‘of the above statements need some additional comments. First, statement (7) 
may seem to be a rather weak statement in that it merely states that the beginning 
of the cause must precede the beginning of the caused event. However, any attempt 
to strengthen this statement will lead to problems. For example, one obvious way to 
strengthen the statement would be to insist that the end of the cause precedes either 
the beginning of the caused event or its end. However, in a statement like “the heavy 
rainfalls caused a landslide”, there is no suggestion that the rains finished before the 
landslide started, or before it ended. Similarly, strengthening the statement to say that 
the end of the cause coincides with the start of the caused event leads to problems. 
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Consider for example the statement “Setting the alarm at 7.00 pm to go off at 7.00 am 
caused it to go off in the morning”. 
Second, statement (8) may seem to be problematic. The statement is intended to say 
that Jordi being happy is incompatible with Jordi being tired. Incompatibility would seem 
to be more naturally regarded as a relationship between event types rather than event 
tokens, and statement (8) demonstrates the superior expressive power of our logic in that 
it allows us to formulate relationships which intuitively would seem to be relationships 
between types without having to admit types in our ontology. Note incidentally that the 
statement should not be read as saying that Jordi being happy at any time is incompatible 
with him being tired at any other time. Knowledge about incompatibility is split between 
a specific statement stating that two events are incompatible (statement (S)), and the 
general temporal patterns (statement (9)). It is easy to ascertain that (8) and (9) and 
the definitions of BEGIN and END imply 
(V’t, t’, u, U’ : T) (HOLDS(huppy(Jordi, t, t’)) A HOLDS(tired(Jordi, u, u’)) --f 
(t’<vVu’<t)). 
The separation between the specific statement and the general pattern allows for a more 
modular representation of temporal knowledge. 
One could only express the first three statements in BTK. Galton’s logic also allows 
for the expression of these statements. Statement 4 could be correctly expressed in his 
logic as: 9 
(Ye : E, t, t’ : T) ((decides_todance(Jordi, i, e) A occurs( e, t, t’)) ---t 
(3e’ : E, u : T) (ECAUSE( e, e’) A dances( Jordi, e’) A 
OCCURS(e’,t’+ 1,~))). 
Statement (5) can also be expressed in Galton’s logic, assuming, as we do, that one 
introduces a second CAUSE predicate which takes as arguments an event token and a 
state token. 
(V/x : I, e : E) (dunces(Jordi, x, e) -+ (3s: S)(tired(x,s) ACAUSE(e,s))). 
Statement (6) can be expressed as: 
(Ye : E, s : S, t: T)(CAUSE(e,s) -+ 
(OCCURS(e,t) -+ (3t’)(HOLDS(s,t’) -+ t < t’))). 
We believe that these statements demonstrate the superiority of our logic. Although 
all statements can be expressed in Galton’s logic, we believe that especially statement 
(4) shows the benefits of having meaningful names for event tokens. It allows us to 
construct expressions using tokens, quantifying over them and picking out parts of them 
like their times and types. Since the information concerning a certain token is gathered 
in a single term, our logic gives a more natural and concise way of expressing temporal 
L, Note that we have slightly changed the underlying ontology and made OCCURS a 3-place rather than a 
2-place predicate. 
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information. For example, since the name for a token includes the time at which the 
token occurs or holds, there is no need for an axiom to ensure that each token occurs 
or holds at only one time. 
5. Conchding remarks 
In this paper, we presented a new reified temporal logic that maintains the expressive 
advantages of reified logic, stays within the bounds of first-order logic, and does not 
force one I:O accept ontologically suspect types of individuals. The main innovation is 
that we do not make the n-place predicate symbol in an initial non-reified non-temporal 
language into an (n + l)- or (n + 2)-place predicate symbol, as one would do in the 
method of temporal arguments, or into an n-place function symbol as one might do in 
Allen’s reifed temporal logic. Instead, we turn it into an (n + 2)-place function symbol. 
The denotation of this symbol is a function from the set of individuals and the set of 
points in time into the set of state or event tokens. We thus get meaningful names for 
such tokens, and we can quantify over parts of these names. It is this latter feature 
which gives us the expressive power that we need, without forcing us into accepting the 
ontologically suspect state or event types. 
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